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EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN. By Elizabeth H. Wol-
gast. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1980. Pp. 176. $12.50. 
Equality is a strong value in the American political tradition. As 
a result, Elizabeth Wolgast points out, it is not surprising that current 
arguments for women's rights frequently rely on equality principles. 
She asserts, however, that because principles of justice are not al-
ways consistent with complete equality of treatment, equality princi-
ples by themselves cannot furnish an adequate conceptual basis for 
an appropriate program of women's rights. Justice requires that men 
and women be treated alike with respect to some rights (such as the 
right to vote), but it also requires that men and women be treated 
differently with respect to other rights (such as the right to maternity 
care benefits). 1 Thus, Wolgast contends, it is a mistake to focus ex-
clusively on the ideal of equality in arguing for women's rights. 
In her opening chapter, Wolgast considers the claim that the 
right to equal treatment is based on similarity or sameness. She finds 
that while this assertion succeeds for race, it fails for sex. In her 
view, although the races are alike in all important respects, men and 
women are not: that women bear children and men do not creates a 
significant difference between the sexes. While a just society should 
ignore differences in skin color, it should respectfully accept differ-
ences of sex. Wolgast argues that an "assimilationist" society - one 
which seeks to ignore totally differences of sex - would be a kind of 
Procrustean bed. It would require massive conditioning to make its 
members think like androgynous creatures with identical sex roles. 
Having found sameness unsatisfactory as a principle for develop-
ing just relations between men and women, Wolgast next examines 
and rejects two other models of equality: equality of ordinary things 
and equality of social peers. First, she explains that to say that two 
things are unequal implies that they must differ in some feature that 
is subject to comparison. In other words, some common measure is 
required. When two things measure the same, they are equal, but a 
judgment of equality presupposes the possibility that the two things 
might have been unequal in the measured respect. When a measure 
is lacking - as between, say, a rainbow and a Wordsworth ode -
then equality is a meaningless concept. Because our morality will 
not acknowledge the possibility of a measure according to which 
I. The author acknowledges that special rights which depend on the particular needs of 
individuals might more properly be termed benefits or privileges rather than rights. She uses 
the terminology of rights, however, because when people commonly speak of ''women's 
rights," they mean to include benefits such as maternity leave. 
860 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:859 
some humans are equal and others unequal, one cannot apply this 
principle of equality to human beings. Indeed, Wolgast argues, the 
real egalitarian thesis is precisely that human worth stands beyond 
measure - an insight which the rhetoric of equality tends to ob-
scure. 
Wolgast similarly finds that the equality of social peers is an in-
appropriate model for just relations between the sexes. She defines 
peers as independent individuals who share a common interest; she 
gives as examples fellow travelers and comrades-at-arms. She con-
tends that while men and women function as peers in some contexts, 
peership does not accurately describe the relationship between hus-
band and wife during the phase of marriage which involves child-
bearing and rearing. 
Although her discussion of equality models seems far from ex-
haustive, Wolgast apparently concludes that any general equality 
model will break down in some respect when applied to relations 
between the sexes. This breakdown, she observes, is evident in at-
tempts to use equality principles to settle legal disputes. In her re-
view of recent Supreme Court cases on women's rights,2 she finds 
that sometimes women's legal rights rest on women's similarity to 
men: a law is unconstitutional, for example, if it prefers a male as 
the administrator of an estate when a male and a female candidate 
have comparable claims. In other cases, women's rights depend on 
their differences from men: only women enjoy the right to have an 
abortion since only women can bear children. In law as in philoso-
phy, the author argues, some of the rights needed by women, espe-
cially those connected with jobs and promotions, are equal rights, 
while others, particularly relating to women who care for a family, 
are special rights. 
Despite the impossiblity of developing a model for just relations 
between men and women that is based entirely on equality principles 
and ignores differences between men and women, Wolgast observes 
that we persist in viewing humans as sexless. She offers two explana-
tions for this inclination: first, our view of human nature as spiritual 
and rational rather than merely animal or physical, and second, the 
atomistic model of society which dominates social science, econom-
ics, and philosophy. These two conceptual traditions, she explains, 
2. The book discusses the following cases: Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); and 
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
950 (1971). 
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create difficulties for the advance of women's rights. As an alterna-
tive to our view of human nature as androgynous, Wolgast advocates 
a "bivalent" form of thinking that distinguishes between the interests 
of men and women. She also believes that we should replace the 
atomistic model of society with one that emphasizes human connec-
tions and interdependence: 
Many important facts should be taken into account: that a baby needs 
someone's time-consuming love and care; that elderly persons are un-
able to compete for their sustenance; that child-bearing and child-nur-
turing are not primarily ways to satisfy self-oriented desires; that 
families are not associations of individuals who join together for their 
mutual benefit. [Pp. 16-17.] 
A model that cannot reasonably represent these facts, she says, is not 
an acceptable model of human society. 
Wolgast concludes that the concept of equality has become a 
convenient but dangerous oversimplification in arguments for wo-
men's rights. The ideal of equality threatens to force women to iden-
tify their interests with those of men and to conform to a masculine 
norm. As Wolgast herself admits, however, merely to recognize that 
justice between men and women requires a combination of equal 
and special rights does not solve the difficult task of specifying the 
appropriate mixture. Equality and the Rights of Women does not at-
tempt this task. The value of Wolgast's book lies in her eloquent 
argument that we cannot begin to solve this problem until we discard 
that "all-purpose" ideal of equality and replace it with a more so-
phisticated conception that recognizes the differences between men 
and women. 
